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“We must challenge every assumption and search for new and better ways to accom-
plish our tasks. We must refine requirements, conduct innovative operations, and op-
timally allocate resources to achieve efficiencies and recapitalize the Fleet.” 
    CNO’s 2003 Leadership Guidance 
  
The cost of operating Navy ships is difficult to determine, but extremely impor-
tant to accurately predict. Under-funding in this area could result in the deferral of 
equipment replacement and spare parts replenishment/consumption, ultimately reducing 
the Navy’s current level of readiness.  Over-funding could hinder the Navy’s efforts to 
recapitalize assets in order to meet future threats.  As the quote above underscores, the 
Navy is determined to more accurately predict resource needs in order to fully fund re-
capitalization efforts. 
Within the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N) and Operations and 
Maintenance, Navy Reserve (O&M,NR) appropriations categories, the Mission and 
Other Ship Operations (1B1B) sub-activity group provides “resources for all aspects of 
ship operations required to continuously deploy combat ready warships and supporting 
forces in support of national objectives” (FY 2003 President’s Budget).  The 1B1B sub-
activity group, to be referred to as Ship Ops throughout this paper, has its resource re-
quirements determined by the OPNAV N80 (programming) staff.  The 1B1B program 




TAD (Travel and Trainings costs: Temporary Additional Duty) 
OPTAR (Operating Target: Includes Repair Parts and Consumables purchases) 
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The Ship Ops sub-activity group includes the costs within each subprogram for 
all active and reserve ships.  The OPNAV N82 office responsible for this sub-activity, 
also known as the Office of Budget (FMB), must collect inputs, assess requirements, and 
provide resources as necessary to support the requirements.  Figure 1 shows the percent-
ages of the total FY 2004 Navy Budget for O&M, N and Ship Ops. 
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Figure 1: Percentages of the Total Navy Budget for O&M,N and 1B1B 
 
In order to support this sub-activity, N80 must have accurate tools to forecast re-
quirement costs based on fleet inputs.  The OPNAV staff uses the Ship Ops model to de-
termine the resource requirements for ship operations. The model was developed by the 
OPNAV N80 (programming) staff several years ago to consolidate inputs from numerous 
resource sponsors.  By consolidating resource sponsor efforts, the model advocates a 
standardized Navy approach to determining resource requirements for Ship Ops.  The 
existing model uses three-year moving averages and average number of ships in commis-
sion to estimate ship-operating costs for the upcoming year.   
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B. RESEARCH DISCUSSION 
FMB feels the current model provides a good first estimate of costs, but wanted 
an evaluation of the model as a predictor of actual ship operations costs.  FMB has also 
expressed an interest in the possible development of a more accurate (specifically in pre-
dicting SR and SO) and flexible (to include operational data such as days underway) 
model.   The current model estimates ship costs according to ship class, using a three-
year average of previous years’ actual operating costs per ship multiplied by the average 
number of ship years per class.  A ship year is defined as a ship in commission for a full 
year.   
Though the current model provides FMB with a good first approximation of oper-
ating costs for a class of ships, FMB feels the model could be improved in its ability to 
predict SR and SO cost.  Further, the current model does not provide the means to esti-
mate the effect of increased Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) in the middle of the year.  
For instance, if the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) is extended on de-
ployment, the model is unable to predict the additional costs.  While FMB can produce 
some numbers to estimate additional operating costs, these numbers are not very defensi-
ble when requesting increased funding.    
 
C. OBJECTIVES 
The intent of this project was to evaluate the current model used by the Office of 
Budget (FMB) to forecast future operating costs for Navy ships and to develop an im-
proved model if warranted.  Further, we sought to develop relationships between opera-
tional data and costs for use in determining supplemental funding requirements. 
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II.  USE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT MODEL 
 
 The model provides FMB with a summary of predictive costs to be used for re-
source requests.  The model has been in use for about five years and there has not been a 
detailed comparison of actual costs to predicted costs.  The obvious limitations of the 
model are scalability and flexibility.  The summary output provided by this model can 
only be reduced, at the lowest level, by ship class and sponsor. The user cannot easily 
input proposed operational adjustments to multiple ships to see the predictive effects on 
cost.  
 Another limitation of the model is its reliance on the outputs using a three-year 
moving average of unit costs.  This method provides a simple means for making cost pre-
dictions and rapidly incorporates the effects of the current environment.  Drawbacks to its 
use in the model are that the third year’s data are an estimate and that one year can have a 
significant impact in the unit’s output (e.g., while planning year 2003’s costs, the pro-
grammer only had preliminary cost data for 2002 based on the past 6-9 months from the 
current fiscal year, which is better than a simple prediction, but still not actual cost). 
 Before analyzing the effectiveness of the current model by comparing actual with 
predicted operating costs, the following section will detail the data that were used to 
compare actual costs with those that were predicted by the current Ship Ops model. 
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III. DATA COLLECTION 
 
A. COST DATA 
Cost data were used in this project for two purposes: first, to evaluate the current 
Ship Ops model’s predictive capabilities; and second, to build a modified model and 
compare its predictions to that of the existing model.  We used various versions of the 
current model, which were provided by FMB, to gather historical cost data for the ap-
praisal part of our work.  The Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and multiple Type Commanders 
(TYCOMs) provided the information for the modified model. 
However, we had certain qualitative and quantitative reservations regarding the 
data.  The qualitative problem surfaced when we were assessing the current model’s ac-
curacy.  It appeared we were not looking at the “first estimates” provided by the Ship Ops 
model (by first estimate we are referring to the predictions that were produced for the 
purposes of the initial budgeting).  Some of the inputs (e.g., price growth) might have 
been updated during the fiscal year in order to get more accurate results.  The benefit 
from doing this is that more accurate estimates can support the argument for additional 
funding when the need arises.  Though our analysis uses only actual data, our conclusion 
could be slightly or significantly different if we compared the “first estimates” to the ac-
tual cost figures.  Our methodology chosen for the analysis – separating the effects 
caused by the model’s discrepancies and effects stemming from input inaccuracy – en-
sures that the basic evaluation remains the same regardless of whether we used the “first 
estimates” or not.  The problem resulting from using the updated predictions is that the 
difference caused by the unreliable inputs may be more significant than we indicated. 
Quantitative problems were mainly caused by the problem of data availability.  
We faced this problem during the process of building the modified model.  Since we used 
various sources, the historical cost data were not always available for the same years.  
The Navy Energy Usage Reporting System (NEURS) data (days underway while under 
various Operational Controls (OPCON)) provided by LANTFLT is only available 
through FY 96.  NEURS data provided by PACFLT go back through FY 92.  Cost data, 
contained in the models provided by FMB, are only available back through FY 94.  This 
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means that we had to find the lowest common denominator, that is, incorporating only 
those fiscal years into the project where “all” the data were accessible. 
When conducting our initial regression analysis it became evident that regressions 
that did not include price growth factors were more significant than those that did include 
them.  This raised suspicion concerning the validity of the inflation factors used in the 
model.  Further investigation by FMB concluded that in order to obtain a weighted aver-
age inflation factor to be used in the model, the Inflation Category Codes, which are as-
signed by the TYCOMs, were not properly assigned.  Therefore, through consultation 
with FMB, we concluded it was more relevant to exclude inflation factors in regressions 
used in formulation of a modified model.    
   
B. EMPLOYMENT DATA 
In order to determine the number of days a given ship (or in aggregate, a ship 
class) was underway during a given year, we obtained data from the NEURS database.  
NEURS is a program the Navy uses to monitor days underway for all surface ships (It 
primarily records the amounts of fuel used.  For our purposes, days underway is the most 
relevant information).  We were able to determine if a ship was underway while on de-
ployment or underway while not on deployment.  With these data we are better able to 
dissect the employment of ships.  When performing analysis by ship class, the variables 
used were days underway while deployed (aggregation of all deployed OPCONs) and 
days underway while not deployed.  Because of the limited data points available for 
analysis we were unable to use the additional variable (Deployed to Fifth Fleet) without 
sacrificing the statistical accuracy of the regressions.   
 
C. SHIP CLASSES CHOSEN 
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For our analysis of the current model we chose to use the Pacific Fleet DDG-51 
class, because of the amount of data available.  It is a large class and it represents the 
growth of the fleet.  In Chapter IV, we use five ship classes FFG-7, DDG-51, CG-47, 
DD-963, and LHA-1 to give an overview of the model’s accuracy at the ship class level 
for the period FY97 through FY02.  These classes provide a broad representation of the 
surface fleet.  DDG-51 represents a class experiencing growth while FFG-7 and DD-963 
are classes experiencing contraction.  LHA-1 and CG-47 are ship classes, that remain 
stable in numbers throughout the period analyzed.   
In our regression analysis, we were limited in the ship classes we were able to 
study.  For example, we were unable to obtain submarine employment data from Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 08).  NAVSEA 08 does not track days underway; 
they maintain information similar to NEURS, but instead of days underway tracks Effec-
tive Full Power Hours for reimbursement to DOE.  We performed regression analysis on 
the following 15 classes of ships for which we had all operations data: 
AOE-1 AOE-6 MCM-1 MHC-51 LHA-1 
LHD-1 LPD-4 LSD-36 LSD-41 CG-47 
DDG-51 DD-963 FFG-7 ARS-50 CVN-68 
 
Table 1: Ship Classes Used in Regression Analysis 
  
Section IV analyzes the effectiveness of the model by comparing actual with pre-
dicted operating costs.  Before presenting our results, this section details our methodol-
ogy and analysis application. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
A. METHODOLGY 
In this section we will discuss the methodology for evaluating the Ship Ops 
model.  Generally, the model creates an average unit cost (per ship year or per OP-
MONTH), and then uses estimated execution data to generate the predicted basic re-
quirement for the next year.  This basic requirement is then adjusted by the estimated 
price growth (percentage growth or decrease) and/or by the estimated incremental cost in 
order to derive the adjusted requirement for the given year.1 
To filter the inaccuracies of the estimated operational and financial inputs, we 
created “predicted from all actual data” (PFAD) costs for ex-post prediction. Figure 2 
shows the structure of the inputs used in the model to produce these quasi-predicted 
numbers.  The PFAD costs demonstrate what would have happened if all the inputs had 
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1 Incremental costs are one-time costs such as replacing foam mattresses with spring mattresses.  Incre-
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Figure 3: Development of PFAD Costs 
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Including the actual cost data, we have three numbers for comparison for each 
cost element: actual, predicted, and PFAD.  The model’s total inaccuracy can be calcu-
lated by subtracting the predicted cost from the actual: 
 
Model’s total inaccuracy = Actual cost – Predicted cost 
 
 
In this way we get the difference between budgeted (predicted) and incurred (ac-
tual) costs, which is our focus.  However, by using the quasi-predicted PFAD costs, we 
can decompose this difference into its two main components. 
First, by obtaining the difference between PFAD and the predicted costs, we de-
termine the effect of data inaccuracy from the budgeting process: 
 
Effect of source data inaccuracy = PFAD  – Predicted cost 
 
The second component can be calculated by determining the disparity of the 
PFAD and the actual cost figures.  This difference gives us important information about 
the model’s predictive ability without the noise caused by imprecise inputs. 
 
Effect of the model’s method = Actual cost – PFAD 
 




Effect of source data inaccuracy + Effect of the model’s method = (PFAD cost – Pre-
dicted cost) + (Actual cost – PFAD cost) = Actual cost – Predicted cost = 




As we will see in the Results section of this chapter, these two component effects 
sometimes occur in the same direction (i.e., both underestimate or both overestimate) and 
combine to increase the total difference.  Other times they have opposite effects, resulting 
in a smaller total difference than would be observed by summing the absolute values of 
the component effects. 
This decomposition method sheds light on problems that are hidden from the ob-
server who only takes into account the total inaccuracy of the model.  However, due to 
the natural variation of actual costs, improving either the accuracy of the source data or 
the model’s predictive ability will not guarantee improvement in individual years. 
 
B. APPLICATION 
Our project focuses on improving the model’s method (reducing the second com-
ponent effect), but we will discuss some input precision (first component) issues.  In the 
second part of the Results section, we use hypothesis testing and the Mean Absolute Per-
centage Error (MAPE) to examine the difference between the PFAD and actual costs.  
 
1.   Hypothesis Test 
For our analysis, we want to see if the differences between actual costs and model 
predictions are in effect random deviation, or if the differences are statistically significant 
and a pattern exists in these differences. The null hypothesis is: the mean of the differ-
ences (Actual – PFAD) is zero; while the alternative hypothesis is that it is not zero: 
H0: µ = 0 
H1: µ ≠ 0 
where µ is the real mean that we do not know, but estimate as X .  We selected the per-
centage error as the basic unit for the test, since it is comparable across ship classes as 
well as years.  We calculated p-values for determining the probability of making a Type I 
error 2 (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true).   The p-value is derived from the t-
statistic, calculated the following way: 
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where s is the sample standard deviation, and n is sample size. 
The p-value is then determined by using a t-distribution table (degrees of freedom 
equals n-1) and the assumption of a two-tailed test, since we are interested in probable 
differences on both ends of the distribution (positive or negative).  From the obtained p-
value, we can either reject the null hypothesis (which implies that the mean of the differ-
ences is not zero, so the model estimates values inaccurately) or accept the null hypothe-
sis (which produces an overall good prediction or insufficient evidence of the opposite). 
 
2.  Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) 
The second method, the MAPE, is more frequently used for evaluating the accu-
racy of forecasting models. It is the average of the prediction’s absolute percentage error.  
It has an advantage of using absolute values for comparison, which eliminates the offset-
ting effect of opposing (positive and negative) component differences.  The MAPE is an 
absolute value, which can be objectively applied for comparing the relative strength of 
different forecasting models. But its disadvantage comes from the fact that it is a subjec-
tive measure when used without a benchmark for comparison. 
 
C. RESULTS 
To demonstrate our evaluation of the current model we will analyze the Pacific 
Fleet DDG-51 ship class for FY 2002.  Excluding CT and NSI costs, the model predicts 
the total O&M,N cost fairly well (see Figure 4).  The model overestimated the costs by 
approximately $17.7 million ($113.1M - $95.4M), which is an 18.6% inaccuracy relative 
to the actual cost.  The component effects are similar, as most of the cost elements ex-








Figure 4: Cost Summary for Pacific Fleet DDG-51 Ship Class FY 2002 
 
SF, which has the largest weight in O&M,N costs (in this case 50.2%), was esti-





Figure 5: Prediction Analysis of Pacific Fleet DDG-51 Ship Class Fuel 
Cost for FY 2002 
 
Applying the decomposition method to these results uncovers some of the reasons 
for the difference between actual and predicted costs. The reason for inaccuracies in fuel 
(SF) cost estimates is not as straightforward as the distinction between model error and 
source data error.  Since analyzing SF cost prediction is not our primary focus, we will 
briefly review the results.   
Figure 5 shows the effect of the source data inaccuracy that at 6.98%, seems rea-
sonable.  This is true in the case of burn rates and fuel prices, but less convincing in the 
number of days underway.  Fuel price is the same as predicted, since ships use a prede-
termined fixed price throughout the year and burn rates do not change significantly over 








Figure 6: Prediction Analysis of Pacific Fleet DDG-51 Ship Class SU, 
SR and SO Costs for 2002 
In each of the remaining three cases (SU, SR, SO) we can draw similar conclu-
sions.  Though the proportion of inaccuracy fluctuates (7.5%, 14.9%, and 42.9% -see 
Figure 6), all show that original prediction problems stem mainly from the model’s calcu-
lation method (effects respectively: 10.4%, 19.5%, and 40.5%).  Even if the planner had 
known what was going to happen in the coming year (in terms of the cost drivers and ad-
justments ship years, operation months price growths, and price growths and incremental 
costs respectively) using the current model’s method, he would have arrived at almost the 
same result.  However, in an individual case it can come from natural variation of costs 
over time; using across-the-board examples we can determine whether it is a general ten-
dency or not.   
For the selected ship classes and for each of the years from 1997 through 2002 we 
ran comparisons measuring the second component effect (model’s inaccuracy). Percent-














1997 -9.39% -6.49% -4.34% -8.87% 18.24%
1998 -12.91% -0.73% 6.75% -5.98% 11.30%
1999 1.64% -2.37% -3.29% -0.31% 13.93%
2000 15.36% 22.97% 29.19% 19.41% 16.71%
2001 -5.43% -4.84% 0.06% -2.54% 21.00%
2002 -15.57% -12.35% -17.20% -14.55% -3.51%
      
 Mean = 1.53%   
 StDev = 12.82% MAPE = 10.24% 
    
 t-value = 0.65    
 p-value = 0.5187    
 
Table 2: Prediction Appraisal of Selected Ship Classes’ Total Costs 
 
Table 2 shows the overall results obtained by analyzing the selected ship classes’ 
total costs (excluding CT and NSI).  The calculated p-value (0.5187) implies strong evi-
dence for not rejecting the null hypothesis, which theoretically means insufficient evi-
dence against H0, but practically, it yields a good overall result that implies a good model 
on the total cost level.  However, we should highlight the deficiencies of this analysis.  
By using simple averages we do not take into consideration the different ship classes. 
On the other hand, the MAPE shows a fairly good picture.  It says, across our 
sample, the total cost was predicted with an average error of 10%.  As mentioned before, 
there is no objective method to evaluate this number.  It is just our perception that deter-
mines this as fairly good.   
As we will see, the hypothesis test determines whether or not the model makes 
mistakes systematically or randomly.  On the other hand, MAPE gives details about its 
ex-post precision, regardless of the possible fact that the model was inaccurate more fre-
quently in one direction then the other. 
Using the same methodology, we can assess the precision of prediction separately 











963CL FFG-7CL LHA-1CL 
1997 3.24% -7.21% -3.84% -34.35% 11.64%
1998 0.94% 5.17% -0.98% -30.03% 25.12%
1999 -7.43% -10.19% -4.29% -1.36% 17.40%
2000 54.10% 51.04% 41.89% 51.72% 36.12%
2001 -11.39% -7.56% -9.72% -19.31% 41.49%
2002 -14.62% -16.82% -11.86% -26.00% 15.69%
      
 Mean = 4.62%   
 StDev = 24.91% MAPE = 19.08% 
     
 t-value = 1.02    
 p-value = 0.3180    
 
Table 3: Prediction Analysis of Selected Ship Classes’ Fuel Cost 
 
The p-value (0.32) gives quite strong evidence against systemic errors; however, 
the MAPE shows only a fair result. In certain ship classes (e.g. FFG-7 or LHA-1) this 
inaccuracy is especially significant and presents systematic patterns (continuous over- 
and under-estimation respectively).  Since this cost group has the most obvious connec-
tion to OPTEMPO (e.g. days underway) it is important to note that actual data yield the 
above results.  We feel these results demonstrate the potential for improvement in the 























1997 16.69% 10.08% 8.99% 11.15% 34.77%
1998 25.30% 12.13% 13.24% 7.84% -44.10%
1999 7.11% -9.38% 2.39% 14.95% 12.67%
2000 2.70% 3.39% 2.61% 3.83% -4.03%
2001 9.36% -1.86% 2.54% -5.89% 7.54%
2002 10.37% 14.81% -11.37% -0.79% 4.52%
      
 Mean = 5.39%   
 StDev = 13.32% MAPE = 10.55% 
      
 t-value = 2.21    
 p-value = 0.0348    
 
 Table 4: Prediction Appraisal of Selected Ship Classes’ Utility Cost 
 
Results from the analysis of utility cost are somewhat surprising (see the summary 
in Table 4).  Although the MAPE shows the best results among all cost elements, the p-
value indicates systematic problems with the model at 96.5% certainty level.  This indi-
cates a statistically significant one-direction deviation from the actual data, which is eas-
ily observable by examining a graph like the one in Figure 7. 
 19





















Figure 7: Actual Versus PFAD for Pacific Fleet DDG-51 Ships 
 
As the example above also shows, SU cost is mostly underestimated if we use ac-
tual execution data as inputs to the model. This seems to be permanent, as the p-value 
confirmed, but whether it is intended or not we don't know. An intended flaw might be 
explained by the commonly used under-financing technique (i.e., 90%) in the beginning 
of the year (when the model is mainly used) in order not to exceed 100% of the obliga-
tions by the end of the year, so as to avoid overspending. If it is not intended, it would be 
worth analyzing more closely. In our view, we think we are observing one of the disad-
vantages of moving average, which happens if there is a continuous upward or downward 
trend in the data, where moving average under- and over-estimates respec-
tively. Correcting this would probably not require big changes in the model (just add-
ing the average difference to the prediction in the case of underestimation), but it will 
work properly while the (upward) trend continues, otherwise it would have the opposite 
effect by causing further inaccuracies if the trend reverses. The planners probably have 
more information about future trends based on which they can decide whether or not they 
are better off with the correction.  
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1997 -24.42% 1.59% 1.87% 9.55% 36.91%
1998 -55.64% -19.26% 4.87% 8.15% -15.24%
1999 -2.52% -4.39% 2.82% 7.80% -10.94%
2000 1.59% 18.78% 25.65% 3.45% 20.70%
2001 0.60% -0.17% -1.12% -5.79% 6.82%
2002 -19.49% -13.95% -30.57% -17.89% -51.00%
      
 Mean = -4.04% SR  
 StDev = 19.94% MAPE = 14.12% 
      
 t-value = 1.11    























1997 -44.46% -41.52% -35.06% -10.34% -18.13%
1998 -11.16% 6.50% 28.34% 6.07% 26.85%
1999 23.85% 24.20% -17.26% -25.70% 23.09%
2000 -57.40% -21.66% 22.98% 6.54% 5.64%
2001 -6.17% -9.47% 25.24% 29.83% 8.95%
2002 -40.48% -17.52% -16.03% 6.82% -22.95%
      
 Mean = -5.01% SO  
 StDev = 24.82% MAPE = 21.34% 
      
 t-value = 1.11    












Table 5: Prediction Analysis of Selected Ship Classes’ SR and SO Cost 
 
We will discuss the last two cost elements together, because they are calculated 
using the same method, namely based on ship years (number of ships in commissioned 
status in a given year).  As shown in Table 5, their p-values are very similar, at a mini-
mum showing a lack of sufficient evidence against systematic errors. Despite the fact that 
this statistical test that shows the errors are evenly distributed, there are significant inac-
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curacies, especially in the prediction of SO.  These fairly high (in our judgment) MAPE 
results underpin the need for some improvement in these cases.  
Comparison of results across cost elements is debatable due to the different char-
acteristics of spending.  But, comparing MAPE results indicates the possibility of 
improving cost estimation in the last two cases by incorporating some kind of operational 
data into the model. 
After analyzing the current techniques to determine predicted costs at the special 
interest item and ship class level, the next chapter is our attempt to improve upon the cur-




In selecting which regressions to use in our modified model, we chose the equa-
tion that resulted in the lowest MAPE.  In some cases, we were unable to find a relation-
ship between costs and operational data.  In other cases, we found marked improvement 
by including operational data as drivers for forecasting costs. Our modified model 
incorporates these improvements, where available, with the current method of using 
three-year averages. We have determined that for SR, our modified model demonstrates 
V. MODIFIED MODEL PROPOSAL 
 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
In this section we will discuss our findings for developing a modified Ship Ops 
model.  As previously stated, our research focuses on improving the predictive capability 
of the current model in the Special Interest Items of SR (Repair Parts) and SO (OPTAR, 
Other).  We will use as a benchmark for comparison the Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
(MAPE) analysis completed in Chapter IV.  Our modified model will be compared 
against the current model to determine whether we have succeeded in improving the 
model’s predictive capability.   
The primary flaw with the current model is that there are no cost drivers other 
than Ship Years.  In essence the model treats all costs as fixed, based on a ship being in 
commission during a given year.  Our modified model seeks to identify the fixed cost (a 
constant in the cost equation) and cost drivers related to operations that could reveal the 
underlying variable cost of operating ships.  In order to do this we have collected opera-
tional information from the NEURS database which identifies a ship’s days underway.  
Further segregation of the data is possible when one considers the OPCON information 
found in the NEURS database.   
In the event we could not determine a relationship between costs and operational 
variables, we looked to improve on the current model’s MAPE by finding relationships 
between cost data and fiscal year (FY).  In most ship classes, we determined a statisti-
cally significant relationship exists between costs and the FY.  This is especially relevant 
given the uncertainty surrounding the current inflation factors (discussed in Chapter III).  
By using FY as an independent variable, we are able to incorporate the historically real-
ized rate of inflation without inputting an arbitrary inflation factor.   
averages. We have determined that for SR, our modified model demonstrates its im-
provement over the current model through its lower overall MAPE (13.39% for the modi-
fied model vs. 20.27% for the current model) as well as a MAPE for each ship class that 
is lower or equal to the current model.  For SO, we were unable to produce significant 
improvement in MAPE when compared with the original model.   
 
B.  DEVELOPING THE MODIFIED MODEL 
This section (Tables 7 and 8) presents the regressions that were found to have the 
lowest MAPE for each of the ship classes analyzed.  Regressions were run to find rela-
tionships between repair parts (SR) cost, consumable (SO) costs and operating data.  An 
independent variable for the year was considered.  Referred to as “FY,” this variable 
aimed to include trends from year to year, to include inflation.  An indicator variable was 
included to differentiate between Pacific and Atlantic Fleet ships when regressions were 
run on all the ships of a class.  This variable was referred to as “Pac Flt.”   This variable 
has a value of either “1” for a Pacific Fleet ship or “0” for an Atlantic Fleet ship.  This 
variable was not included when the regressions were done for the individual fleets since it 
was not required. 
Based on the information in the NUERS database, five possible independent vari-
ables could be considered.  The first was days underway while not deployed and was 
identified as “UW not dep.”  There were three variables to consider for days underway 
while deployed.  Days underway deployed to the Fifth Fleet Area of Responsibility 
(AOR) are identified separately in the NUERS database by OPCON code 17.  The vari-
able representing this is “code 17” in the following regressions.  When ships were de-
ployed but not to the Fifth Fleet AOR, these days were represented by the variable “UW 
dep not 17.”  Finally, the variable “Total UW deployed” is the summation of the previous 
two variables.  The last variable “Total UW” considers the total number of days under-
way deployed and not deployed. 
Some exceptions apply.  Due to the lack of data points, regressions by class do 
not consider whether a ship is deployed to the Fifth Fleet or not, only that it is underway 
deployed.  Further, in order to keep with the model’s current convention of computing 
 24
unit cost for SR and SO and then multiplying by the number of Ship Years, we have de-
cided to use the dependant variable SR per ship (or SO per ship) when determining the 
equation to predict costs by class. 
To summarize, the variables used in the following regressions and their meanings 
are as follows: 
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Table 6: Variables used in Regressions 
Dependent Variables 
SR  A dependent variable to estimate repair parts costs for a ship in the class when using “by hull” data. 
SO  
A dependent variable to estimate SO for a ship in the 
class consumable costs for a ship in the class when using 
“by hull” data. 
SR per ship A dependent variable to estimate SR costs when using class data. 
SO per ship A dependent variable to estimate SO costs when using class data. 
Independent Variables 
FY  
An independent variable representing the current fiscal 
year.  Fiscal Year 2000 was used as the base (00).  There-
fore fiscal year 1999 is represented by a negative one (-1) 
and fiscal year 2001 by a positive one (1). 
Pac Flt  
A binary (one or zero) indicator variable to represent the 
fleet in which a ship is home ported.  A ship assigned to 
the Atlantic Fleet would have a value of zero and one as-
signed to the Pacific Fleet would have a value of one. 
UW not dep 
Represents the days spent underway and while not in a 
deployed status.  In the NUERS database this is repre-
sented by the time spent in code eight. 
Code 17 
Represents the days underway on deployment while in 
the 5th Fleet AOR.  This time is represented by code 17 in 
the NUERS database. 
UW dep not 17 
Represents the days spent underway and on deployment 
when operating in areas SO than the 5th fleet AOR.  This 
is represented by the code nine in the NUERS database. 
Total UW deployed 
Is the summation of the days under “Code 17” and “Total 
UW deployed.”  This represents the total number of days 
underway while in a deployed status. 
Total UW 
Represents the total number of days a ship was underway 
in a year.  It is the summation of the time spent in codes 
eight, nine and seventeen in the NUERS database. 
Total UW / SY 
The total days underway for a class during a year divided 
by the ship years.  This represents the average number of 
days underway per ship. 
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 Multiple regressions were run in Minitab (a commercial statistical software pack-
age) to consider the various combinations of these variables.  In order to find any rela-
tionships that exist across an entire class, the ships were aggregated by class and fleet.   
Then the ships were divided into their respective fleets and further regressions were per-
formed to find any relationships that were fleet specific. 
There are a few exceptions to this practice.  Only ships from the Atlantic Fleet 
were considered for the CVN-68 class.  Data for the Pacific Fleet ships of this class were 
not available.  The MCM class does not have ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet.  Ships 
are home ported in the Atlantic Fleet, Bahrain, and Japan.  Although assigned to Japan, 
for budgeting purposes these ships are considered part of the Atlantic Fleet.  Regressions 
performed on this class of ship were separated by homeport: Atlantic, Bahrain, and Japan.  
The MHC class had a similar issue since these ships are only home ported in Bahrain.  
Detailed analysis of regressions can be found in the appendices of our full MBA report. 
 
C.  EVALUATING OUR MODEL 
We established which classes of ships have demonstrated a significant relation-
ship to either an operational variable (days underway) or a sequential variable (FY).  We 
constructed our modified model based on the premise that if we lower the MAPE for any 
portion of the model we improve the predictive capability of the model.  With that in 
mind, Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate which classes (in which fleets) have a statistically sig-
nificant relationship with a variable not included in the current model that could improve 




















































































Table 8: Best MAPE by Type of Regression SR 
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We have demonstrated that in some cases the current model is the most accurate 
means of predicting costs (lower MAPE or no significant regressions were found), while 
in other cases a driver other than ship years is more appropriate.  Tables 9 and 14 show 
the actual cost by class and fleet, the PFAD (the best possible output of the current 































































































































































































Table 12: MAPE Comparison for PFAD and the Mod. Model SO 2002 
 





























































































Table 14: MAPE Comparison for PFAD and the Mod. Model SO 2000 
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D. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
From the above data, Table 15 below summarizes the Weighted MAPE for each 
year. 
SR PFAD Mod. Model 
2002 15.14% 15.39% 
2001 33.01% 15.28% 
2000 12.67% 9.50% 
Mean 20.27% 13.39% 
 
SO PFAD Mod. Model 
2002 20.58% 20.70% 
2001 20.91% 23.41% 
2000 19.34% 14.97% 
Mean 20.27% 19.69% 
 
Table 15: Weighted MAPE Summary 
 
The above results demonstrate that the modified model is able to lower the overall 
MAPE verses the PFAD MAPE for SR.  For SO, the modified model is able to lower the 
MAPE only fractionally.  We feel that these results are appropriate given the focus of our 
study.  Though we were able to establish relationships between SR cost and operational 
data for several ship classes, the optimal MAPE was generally the result of regressions 
with FY as an independent variable.  This relationship replaces the current methodology 
of three-year average with a regression equation.  Though we did not observe the im-
provement we had hoped for in the SO model, we feel this is caused partially by the na-
ture of spending in this Special Interest Item.  SR cost is driven by specific material or 
inventory deficiency.  SO, on the other hand has a tendency to be more discretionary.  
Given the above results, we recommend using a regression-based model to predict 
cost for SR.  Further, we also recommend implementation of a regression based model 
for SO prediction.  Though the improvement in MAPE is negligible, the increased flexi-
bility in the modified model represents an improvement worthy of implementation.   
